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Banks’ Capital Buffers, Risk and Performance in the Canadian Banking System: 
Impact of Business Cycles and Regulatory Changes 
 
Abstract 
Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six 
largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between 
Canadian banks’ capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the 
balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this 
cyclical behaviour of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized 
and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain 
how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian 
banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both 
micro- and a macro-prudential “through-the-cycle” approach to capital adequacy as advocated 
in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector. 
Keywords:  Capital Buffer, Risk, Performance, Basel Accords, Regulation,  
Business Cycles, Canadian Banks 
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2 
Banks’ Capital Buffer, Risk and Performance in the Canadian Banking System: 
Impact of Business Cycles and Regulatory Changes 
 
I. Introduction 
The 2007 subprime turmoil underscores the imperative for a sound micro- and macro- 
prudential framework for banking regulation and supervision to build up resilience against 
severe crises and to ensure the stability of the entire financial system.1 During this crisis, 
Canada’s banking system performed much better than other industrialized countries. Even as 
high-profile banks in Europe, the United States and elsewhere collapsed, were bailed out, or 
underwent imposed take-overs—Fortis, Citigroup, UBS and the Royal Bank of Scotland are a 
few examples—not one Canadian bank failed or was openly bailed out. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between bank capital buffers and business 
cycles in Canada’s banking sector. We first examine the cyclicality of Canadian banks’ 
capital buffer with respect to business cycles, where the buffer (excess capital) is the size of 
the capital cushion that exceeds the regulatory capital requirement of the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). Cyclicality of bank capital is defined as the 
co-movement between business cycles and bank capital. Positive co-movement implies 
counter-cyclicality and negative co-movement denotes procyclicality.2 Therefore, to have 
counter-cyclicality between bank capital buffers and the business cycle, capital has to be 
accumulated in booms and lower in troughs. Second, we analyze the impact of capital buffers 
on banks’ risk and performance, controlling for business cycles as well as for capital 
regulatory environments, namely in the period preceding the Basel Accords, during Basel I, 
and during amendments to the Basel I and Basel II regimes. Our research questions are as 
follows: (1) Do Canadian banks’ capital buffers run counter to business cycles? (2) Are 
Canadian banks’ capital buffers sensitive to changes in capital regulations? (3) How sensitive 
are Canadian banks’ risk to changes in their capital buffer? (4) How do induced changes in 
bank capital buffers affect the performance of Canadian banks? 
Our work departs from the literature on capital buffers in several ways. First, it uses an 
extensive database of quarterly data over a relatively long period (1982 to 2010) to study 
Canada’s banking sector. Second, unlike some previous research, our study period covers at 
                                                            
1
 Micro actions pertain to management actions at the bank level. Macro actions refer to monetary and other 
policies at the country level or higher.  
2
 See for instance, Illing and Paulin (2004). 
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least three regulatory environments. Third, we study the relationship between capital buffers, 
risk and performance simultaneously, developing a system of three simultaneous equations 
that link capital buffer, risk and performance within several business cycles and multiple 
regulatory changes. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to comprehensively address these 
issues relating to capital buffers in the Canadian context. 
We find that Canadian banks are well-capitalized, exceed the minimum requirements 
for both the regulatory capital buffer (5.09%) and the leverage capital buffer (0.49%). These 
findings provide one possible explanation for how Canadian banks weathered the recent 
financial crisis better than banks in other countries.3 
We also document positive co-movement between Canadian banks’ capital buffer and 
business cycles (countercyclical effects): more capital is being accumulated during booms. In 
exploring the role played by the Basel regulations in this relationship, we find that this 
positive co-movement is still present after the 1996 amendment to the Basel I Accord adopted 
in 1998, although it is more pronounced over the 1988-1997 Basel I period. 
We also find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between variations 
in banks’ capital buffer and banks’ risk exposure. This finding is similar to that of Lindquist 
(2004), who found support for the hypothesis that capital buffers may be considered as 
insurance against failure to meet capital requirements. Our results support the view that Basel 
and the leverage constraints imposed by Canadian regulators, principally the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), have to some extent succeeded at better 
aligning Canadian banks’ risk-taking with their capital base. 
Finally, we find that the impact of capital buffer on the performance of Canadian 
banks depends on how performance is measured. When equity returns are used to measure 
performance, there is no effect. However, if returns on assets (ROA) or Tobin’s Q are used as 
performance measures, capital buffers have a significant and positive impact on ROA and a 
negative impact on Tobin’s Q. 
We can then draw two main policy implications from the Canadian experience. First, 
rigorous and disciplined implementation of both risk-based and non-risk-based capital 
requirements may help mitigate the well-documented procyclicality associated with current 
Basel risk-based capital charges. Secondly, capital requirements should be higher during 
                                                            
3
 Other reasons include conservative mortgage practices, non-reliance on money market wholesale funding, and 
higher liquidity ratios (e.g., Northcott et al (2009), Ratnovski and Huang (2009)). 
4 
booming economic periods because this is when banks can accumulate more capital. 
Conversely, a reduction in capital requirements during recessionary periods would be 
welcome since this may provide more room for banks to operate. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section II, we discuss our empirical 
framework. In section III, we describe the data and present the descriptive statistics. In section 
IV, we discuss and interpret the empirical results. In section V, we carry out robustness 
checks. We conclude in section VI. 
II. Empirical framework 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime (2001) and others have 
used systems of two simultaneous equations to study the relationship between banks’ risk and 
their capital. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Altunbas et al (2007), in contrast, formulated 
systems of three simultaneous equations to study banks’ capital, risk and efficiency (derived 
from stochastic cost frontiers) endogenously. Note that while our specification follows the 
latter approach, we depart from it, first by focusing on capital buffers instead of capital ratios 
and second by superimposing the effect of business cycles under banking regulation changes. 
We use the following system of simultaneous equations: 
∆BUFj,t = f1(SIZEj,t, CREDITj,t, OUTGAPt, ∆RISKj,t, ∆PERFj,t, BUFRj,t, BUFj,t-1, 
DREGt, OUTGAPt×DREGt),      (1) 
∆RISKj,t = f2(VTSXt, TERMt, CVj,t, OUTGAPt, ∆BUFj,t, ∆PERFj,t, RISKj,t-1, DREGt, 
OUTGAPt×DREGt, ∆BUFj,t ×DREGt),     (2) 
∆PERFj,t = f3(CR3t, SIZEj,t, TERMt, OUTGAPt, ∆BUFj,t, ∆RISKj,t, PERFj,t-1, DREGt,  
OUTGAPt×DREGt, ∆BUFj,t ×DREGt),     (3) 
where the dependent variables are as follows: 
∆BUFj, t The variation of the capital buffer of bank j at time t; 
∆RISKj,t  The variation of risk of bank j at time t; 
∆PERFj,t  The variation of performance of bank j at time t. 
These variables and the other explanatory variables are defined below. But before describing 
the variables, we give a brief overview of the regulatory background in Canada. 
5 
2.1. Regulatory background 
Canada’s banking sector is regulated by the Bank Act and is enforced by Canada’s Office 
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). This law was passed in 1871 and was 
supposed to be reassessed and updated each decade (Calmès, 2004). The 1987 amendment to 
the Bank Act allowed banks to acquire investment dealers. In 1988, Basel regulations 
introduced credit risk-based capital requirements. Since then, Canadian banks have accounted 
for this risk when calculating their risk-weighted assets (RWA). In 1992, another amendment 
to the Bank Act allowed banks to buy trust companies. In addition, the Bank Act’s review 
period was shortened from ten to five years (Calmès, 2004). 
In 1997, following the 1996 amendment to the Basel I, the Bank Act required banks to 
account for market risk when computing their RWA. This amendment started to be enforced 
in 1998.4 In 2004, Basel II introduced operational risk into the RWA calculation and proposed 
the internal ratings-based approach for credit risk. Canada enforced the Basel II requirements 
starting in November 2007. 
2.2. Capital buffers, risk and performance measures 
We use three capital ratio measures to compute the buffer. Our first and main measure 
of the capital ratio is the leveraged capital ratio (CAPL). It is the inverse of the balance sheet 
leverage ratio and is obtained as the ratio of shareholders’ book equity over total assets, as in 
Flannery and Rangan (2008). The buffer with this capital ratio measure is denoted as BUFL 
and is measured by CAPL minus the inverse of the balance sheet leverage ratio cap fixed by 
Canadian banking regulations. 
Our second capital ratio variable is CAP, which measures a bank’s capital-to-risk-
weighted assets (RWA) ratio. We use this second capital ratio to calculate the capital buffer as 
the difference between CAP and the minimum regulatory capital requirement and denote it as 
BUFR. 
We also compute a third capital ratio, the economic capital ratio (CAPE), using the 
value at risk (VaR) based on the bank’s asset distribution.5 The economic capital buffer BUFE 
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 An OSFI report states that “Beginning January 1st 1998, deposit-taking institutions with significant trading 
portfolios are required to maintain capital to cover market risks.” 
5
 We compute VaR using the asset distribution at the 99.97% confidence level, which supposes a credit rating of 
at least AA+ for each bank of the sample. We derive asset values from contingent claim analysis, as in Ronn and 
Verma (1986). 
6 
is obtained as the difference between the bank’s actual capital ratio and its economic capital 
ratio. 
BUFL is our main capital buffer measure because it is easy to compute and to 
interpret. BUFR and BUFE, however, are difficult to obtain due to the lack of complete and 
comprehensive information and data to compute the risk-weighted assets and VaR of 
Canadian banks; these measures are thus less precise than BUFL. 
We use three risk measures: total equity risk (TRISK), market idiosyncratic risk 
(IRISK) and the implicit volatility of assets (ARISK). We calculate TRISK using the standard 
deviation of daily equity returns over the quarter. We calculate IRISK using a GARCH (1,1) 
in mean of conditional volatility on the residual from a multifactor market model over the last 
quarter of daily observations. This is similar to Song (1994), Flannery et al (1997) and Calmès 
and Théoret (2010), among others.6 We add an additional factor for exchange rate risk to the 
market multifactor model used by Chen et al (2006) and Pathan (2009) as follows: Rj,t= β0,t + 
βm,j Rm,t+ βI,j UI,t+ βx,jUx,t + ɛj,t, where Rj,t is the equity return of bank j at time t, Rm,t is the 
market premium, UI,t represents the interest rate risk premium computed as the difference 
between the long-term Canadian government bond yield and the T-bill yield, Ux,t is the 
exchange rate premium computed as one minus the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar to 
the US dollar (the US dollar is the most commonly used foreign currency in Canada) and ɛj,t is 
the error term. 
The risk measure ARISK is the implicit volatility of asset returns (σV) obtained using 
the approach of Ronn and Verma (1986). Total asset value (V) and its implicit volatility (σV) 
are obtained by solving a system of equations based on shareholders’ equity defined as a call 
option: K = V N(x) – ρ B N(x-σV√), with x = [Ln (V / ρ B) + (σV²T/2)]/ σV √ and σK = σV V 
N(x)/K, where V is the implicit total asset value (the first unknown), K is the market value of 
equity, B is the book value of the bank’s total debt, σK is the standard deviation of the bank’s 
equity returns, σV is the unobserved bank asset return volatility (the second unknown), ρ is a 
regulatory parameter, T is the maturity of the debt (we assume 1 year), N(.) is the standard 
cumulative normal distribution function, and Ln is the logarithmic operator. The parameter ρ 
equals 0.97 as in Ronn and Verma (1986) and Giammarino et al (1989) for American and 
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with Akaike and Schwarz’s criteria, we find GARCH-M to be best.  
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Canadian banks, respectively. Gueyie and Lai (2003) have also used this constant in their 
study of bank moral hazard and the introduction of deposit insurance in Canada. 
As a measure of performance, we use the banks’ mean daily stock market returns 
(RET) over the last calendar quarter. We also use alternative performance metrics: (i) the 
return on assets (ROA) obtained as the ratio of net income over total assets, and (ii) Tobin’s Q 
(QTOB) computed as the market value of equity divided by its book value. 
2.3. Explanatory variables 
We use the following explanatory variables:7 
- SIZEj,t represents the log of total assets of bank j at time t and controls for the size effect 
(Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Rime (2001), among others). We expect this variable to 
negatively impact the variation in the capital buffer and performance. 
- OUTGAPt is a business cycle indicator. It is the cyclical component of real gross domestic 
product (GDP) obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. We use the cyclical 
output gap instead of real GDP because it removes trends from time series variables. 
- GDPGt is the quarterly growth rate of real GDP. 
- CR3t is the income concentration ratio at time t computed as the ratio of the total net 
income of the three largest banks divided by the total net income of the sector. This 
variable is used to proxy industrial concentration and competition in the banking sector 
(e.g., Bikker and Haaf (2002), Beck et al (2006) and Alegria and Schaeck (2008)). We 
expect this variable to positively impact performance. 
- CVj,t is the charter value used to control for banks’ incentives for risk-taking (e.g., Jokipii 
(2009) and Keeley (1990)). It is calculated as follows: 
CV = Ln((BVA + MVE – BVE) / BVE), where BVA is the book value of assets, MVE is 
the market value of equity, and BVE is the book value of equity. 
- VTSXt is the volatility of the market index, a proxy for Canadian market risk. It has been 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of the S&P/TSX Composite Index8 
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 To control for the active adjustment of capital buffers in response to banking regulations and business cycles, 
we added variables such as capital issuance, dividend policy parameters, reinvested earnings and external 
financing to the original model and found that results did not differ significantly from the results obtained from 
the basic model. Therefore, to keep the model simple, we dropped these additional variables. 
8
 This index was the TSE 300 index before 2002.  
8 
over the last quarter. The index includes the six Canadian chartered banks in our sample, 
as well as many other firms. We expect a positive relationship between this market risk 
and our six banks’ risk measures. 
- CREDITj,t is the ratio of total loans over total assets and is used to control for the impact 
of lending activities on a bank’s capital buffer. 
- TERMt, the difference between the yield on long-term Canadian government bonds and 
the T-bill yield, captures shocks on the term structure of interest rates. 
- DREGt are dummy variables to control for the stages of Basel regulations. DREG1 takes a 
value of 1 over 1988-1997 and zero elsewhere to reflect Based I regulations before the 
amendment. DREG2 controls for the 1997 amendment to the Bank Act and Basel II 
effects. The 1997 amendment to the Bank Act came at the end of that year and was 
enforced in 1998. DREG2 takes a value of 1 from 1998 to 2010 and zero elsewhere. 
- OUTGAPt×DREGt is the cross-product of OUTGAPt and the regulatory regime dummy 
DREGt, and captures the interaction between business cycles and the regulatory regimes. 
- ∆BUFj,t×DREGt is the cross-product of ∆BUFj,t and the regulatory regime dummy 
DREGt, and captures the interaction between variations in capital buffers and the 
regulatory regimes. 
- We also use bank dummies to control for bank-specific effects. 
 
2.4. Econometric issues 
In estimating our simultaneous equations, we use the two-step generalized method of 
moments (2SGMM) estimation technique in a panel data context to deal with potential 
endogeneity between variables. Since GMM is an instrumental variables method, we use the 
level and the first differences of the variables as instruments, and to tackle potential serial 
correlations, we use the first differences of the dependent variables as done by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). We also include lags of each dependent variable as instruments to account for 
the simultaneity of capital buffers, risk and performance adjustments. 
Our focus on changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance lead to the use of 
only first differences as dependent variables, thus reducing the likelihood of spurious 
regressions since first differences of variables are all stationary in this context. Furthermore, 
9 
the two-step GMM with panel data is more efficient than two-stage least squares, which is 
also a limited information technique but does not account for heteroscedasticity. 
Finally, the fixed effect panel estimation has been favored to the first difference 
estimation option which is the only available option for the 2-step GMM in the panel data 
context. There are two main reasons for this choice: (1) the system of endogenous equations 
that we have chosen is mixed, in that it considers both first differences and levels of variables, 
and (2) our database has a small number of banks, only six.9 
III. Data and descriptive statistics 
As of 31 December 2010, Canada’s banking sector is comprised of 22 Canadian 
banks, 26 subsidiaries of foreign banks and 22 branches of foreign banks offering a full range 
of financial services. The entire sector managed approximately CAN $3100 billion worth of 
assets. Our sample is composed of the six largest Canadian chartered banks. The banks in our 
sample, ranked by asset size as of the last quarter of 2010, are as follows: the Royal Bank of 
Canada (RY), the Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD), the Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), the Bank 
of Montreal (BMO), the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CM) and the National Bank 
of Canada (NA). These banks account for approximately 90% of the total assets of Canada’s 
banking sector and 75% of the assets of deposit institutions. 
For all bank-specific variables, we have used data from Bloomberg, supplemented by 
data collected manually from the banks’ reports.10 For Canadian economic variables, we 
obtained data from various publications and other sources at Statistics Canada and the Bank 
of Canada. Table 1 defines the variables and presents descriptive statistics (number of 
observations, means and standard deviations) of our sample of quarterly data from 1982 to 
2010. Compared to other studies of Canadian banking, our number of observations is 
substantial.11 We performed a synchronisation between market and accounting data as in 
Claessens et al (1998) and Easton and Gregory (2003).12 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. 
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 There is therefore no need to use a Haussmann test in our analysis. 
10
 For the capital-to-RWA ratio before 1988, we used the ratio of capital to assets, as in Flannery and Rangan 
(2008).  
11
 We used over 650 quarterly book observations. Shaffer (1993), who tested competition among Canadian 
banks, only used annual data between 1965 and 1989 (24 observations). Nathan and Neave (1989) used 39 
observations, D'Souza and Lai (2004) used 125 quarterly observations and Gueyie and Lai (2003) used 115 
annual observations. The best case is Allen and Liu (2007), who used 480 quarterly observations. 
12
 In general, accounting data delay behind market data, but the lag is usually short. Since we are using quarterly 
data, we take one quarter as the lag. 
10 
From Table 1, we observe an average leverage capital buffer BUFL of 0.49%, a 
regulatory capital buffer BUFR of 5.09% and an economic capital buffer BUFE of 3.50% for 
the six banks. The average quarterly stock return (RET) is 3.99%. The quarterly average ROA 
is 0.20% and average Tobin’s Q (QTOB) is 1.45. Quarterly total equity risk (TRISK) is 
1.45% and idiosyncratic risk (IRISK) is 1.47%. Implicit asset volatility risk (ARISK) is 
0.93%. 
Table 2 presents the matrix of correlations between the variables. BUFL is negatively 
correlated to the three measures of banks risks but the correlation coefficients are very low, in 
absolute value not more than 6.92%. In fact, BUFL is negatively correlated with TRISK (-
5.46%), with IRISK (-3.57%) and with ARISK (-6.92%). BUFL is negatively correlated to 
RET (-12.2%) and QTOB (-16.19%), but is positively correlated to ROA (3.34%), suggesting 
that the relationship between bank capital buffers and their performance may depend on the 
performance metric used. 
Meanwhile, BUFL is positively related to BUFR (1.43%), but negatively correlated 
with BUFE (-6.30%). The correlation between BUFR and BUFE is 15.31%. These three 
measures of banks’ capital buffer represent different capital requirement dynamics and one 
should be cautious in interpreting and generalizing results obtained with each measure. The 
correlations between the risk measures are positive: 64.12% between IRISK and TRISK, 
10.81% between ARISK and TRISK, and 10.10% between ARISK and IRISK. RET is 
positively correlated with TRISK (5.36%) and IRISK (3.31%), and is negatively correlated 
with ARISK (-6.07%). 
Finally, as seen in Table 2, there are no strong correlations between the variables 
forming our system of equations. The risk of multicolinearity in this study is thus very low. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. 
IV. Empirical results  
Let us look back at our four research questions: (1) Do Canadian banks’ capital buffers 
run counter to business cycles? (2) Are Canadian banks’ capital buffers sensitive to changes 
in capital regulation? (3) How sensitive is the risk held by Canadian banks to changes in their 
capital buffer? (4) How do induced changes in capital buffers affect the performance of 
Canadian banks? 
11 
To answer our research questions, as described previously, we constructed business 
cycles using the cyclical component of Canadian real GDP. Over the sample period of 1982-
2010, we distinguish three regulatory regimes: (1) before 1988, when Canada’s Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) adopted the Basel I Accords; (2) 1988 to 
1997, when Basel I rules were enforced and the risk-weighted assets (RWA) approach based 
on credit risk was introduced. Canadian regulations mandated an 8% minimum capital-to-
RWA ratio in 1988; this figure rose to 10% in 2000; and (3) 1998 to 2010, after OSFI adopted 
the 1996 amendment to the Basel I Accord, which introduced market risk as a distinct risk 
category, and when the spirit of the Basel II Accord shaped the 2000s.13 These regulatory 
changes are captured by the dummy variables DREG1 and DREG2. 
4.1. Do Canadian banks’ capital buffers run counter to business cycles? 
We use information about business cycles to create three data panels: (i) an 
unconditional panel that considers full business cycles without distinguishing troughs from 
peaks; (ii) an economic expansion panel, that only considers peak periods; and (iii) an 
economic recession panel, that only considers periods in the trough. For each panel, we 
calculate the capital ratios CAP, CAPL and CAPE for the six Canadian banks. We use these 
capital ratios to calculate the associated capital buffers BUFR, BUFL and BUFE. 
Descriptive statistics for each economic phase, given in Table 3,14 show that on 
average, CAP is higher than CAPE, which suggests that Canadian banks hold more capital 
than what is “economically” required, since economic capital can be viewed as the level of 
capital that banks have to hold to remain technically viable (Kretzschmar et al, 2010) in a 
fully disciplined market without government safety nets. Also, the average regulatory capital 
buffer BUFR is 5.09%, the leverage capital buffer BUFL is 0.49% and the economic capital 
buffer is 3.50%. These findings suggest that Canadian banks are well-capitalized. They also 
hold less capital in recessions according to all of the measures used. Canadian banks appear to 
build up their capital buffer during boom periods and consume them during troughs when 
they are most needed. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
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 Many regulatory in Canada resulted from bank problems in the 1990s. To prevent more bank failures, 
Canadian regulations were stricter than regulations elsewhere. For a history of Canada’s banking system and 
changes in regulation, see Saunders et al (2006). 
14
 To alleviate outliers’ bias, when calculating aggregate BUFE, we exclude 5% of the right tail of the 
distribution and use the 95% of the data that remains to calculate the mean for the banks. 
12 
The graphs in Figure 1 plot capital buffers and the business cycles over the sample 
period. The graphs suggest a positive co-movement between capital buffers (BUFL and 
BUFR) and business cycles. In the case of BUFL, the relationship appears to change during 
the recent subprime crisis. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. 
We further our analysis with a multivariate analysis using the simultaneous equations 
(1-3). The results are presented in Table 4. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of the table present results 
without controlling for changes in regulatory frameworks. As mentioned above, changes in 
regulatory regimes are controlled with the dummy variable DREG1 for OSFI’s adoption of 
Basel I (columns 4, 5 and 6) and the dummy variable DREG2 for the 1996 amendment of the 
Basel I Accord as well as adoption of Basel II (columns 7, 8 and 9). Columns 10, 11 and 12 
include both dummies DREG1 and DREG2 and control for the two regulatory regimes. The 
results for each model show a positive and significant relationship between variations in 
capital buffers (∆BUFLt) and the output gap (OUTGAPt) over the sample period. We interpret 
this result as evidence that Canadian banks build up capital during boom periods and consume 
a portion of this buffer in the lean times, meeting the capital requirement. In fact, many critics 
have pointed out that the Basel capital regulations are procyclical by design, in that it requires 
banks to increase their capital ratio when they face greater risks. Unfortunately, this situation 
may force banks to lend less during recessions, leading to credit crunches and potentially 
aggravating a downturn. Our finding of positive co-movement between capital buffers and the 
business cycle, however, can be interpreted as evidence of countercyclical effects in the 
Canadian banking sector. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. 
In the next section, we examine whether the countercyclical effect found above is 
sensitive to changes in the regulatory environment. 
4.2. Are Canadian banks’ capital buffers sensitive to changes in capital regulation? 
Figure 2 shows business cycles and regulatory regimes over the study period. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. 
Figure 3 plots the banks’ average capital-to-RWA ratio over time, along with the balance 
sheet leverage ratio, measured by total assets divided by shareholders’ book equity. As shown 
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in panel A of Figure 3, their average capital-to-RWA ratios increased over the study period 
after a secular decrease in banks’ capital.15 The increase is more pronounced in the periods 
leading up to regulatory change. Thus, we observe sudden increases, especially after the 
announcement of the Basel I Accords in 1987 and after the announcement of the amendment 
of Basel I in 1996. As for the impact of Basel II on Canadian banks, we observe that the 
increase in the capital ratio took place in 2008, four years after OSFI started progressive 
adoption of Basel II. This period corresponds with enforcement of the advanced credit risk 
approach in Canada. The graphs confirm our previous claim about the adequate level of 
capitalization of Canadian banks since the early 1980s, even after the minimum regulatory 
capital requirement rose to 10% in the beginning of the 2000s. 
The explanations for these observed trends are as follows. First, no risk-adjusted 
capital ratio requirements existed prior to 1988 because Basel I guidelines were only 
introduced in that year. After Canadian regulators adopted the Basel I regulations and banks 
began to account for their credit risk in the denominator of their capital ratio, the ratio fell. 
However, with the 1996 amendment, Canadian regulators not only maintained the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement, but also reduced the leverage ratio limit. Indeed, Canada’s 
banking authority capped the balance sheet leverage ratio at 30 from 1982 to 1991. Late in 
1991, the authority decreased the limit to 20, where it remained until 2000, when it rose to 23 
under certain conditions. This leverage ratio requirement has been shown to mitigate 
asymmetric information and agency problems (e.g., Blum (2008)), and some claim that it 
helped make Canada’s banking sector more resilient to the recent credit turmoil (e.g., 
Bordeleau et al (2009) and Dickson (2009)). Also, after 2000, Canada increased the minimum 
regulatory capital-to-RWA ratio from 8% to 10%. These regulatory changes increased the 
level of capital in Canada’s banking sector after 1998, since one would have expected the 
capital ratio to decrease or remain more or less the same after the introduction of market risk 
as a new risk category. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE. 
To determine how sensitive Canadian banks’ capital buffers are to regulatory changes, 
we analyse the impact of regulatory variables DREG1 and DREG2 on the change in bank 
capital buffers. As explained before, changes in regulatory regimes are controlled with 
dummy variables DREG1 for OSFI’s adoption of Basel I (see columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 4 
                                                            
15
 Saunders and Wilson (1999) document a continual decrease of banks’ capital from 1893 to 1982. 
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for the results) and DREG2 for the 1996 amendment of the Basel I Accords and the adoption 
of Basel II (see columns 7, 8 and 9 of Table 4 for the results). In columns 10, 11 and 12 of 
Table 4, we include the dummies for both regulatory regimes in the regressions. We control 
for the combined effects of business cycles and regulatory environments by using the cross-
products OUTGAP*DREG1 and OUTGAP*DREG2, respectively, for Basel I regulations and 
then the 1996 amendment of Basel I and the Basel II regulations. 
The relationship between variations in BUFL and DREG1*OUTGAP and 
DREG2*OUTGAP are not significant. Hence, the magnitude of the positive co-movement 
between capital buffers and the business cycle is not affected by the two Basel regulatory 
regimes. This relationship between business cycles and capital buffers during the Basel 
Accord periods is very interesting, since many authors have criticized the Basel Accords as 
being procyclical by design, especially after the 1996 amendment and during the Basel II 
period. We instead find a countercyclical effect during Basel I as well as during the 1996 
amendment and Basel II periods. 
However, the regulatory dummy DREG1 alone has a significant negative impact on 
the variations of BUFL, while the dummy DREG2 has a positive significant impact on BUFL. 
Indeed, the balance sheet leverage ratio limit was decreased from 30 to 20 in 1991 and was 
increased to 23 in 2000. Also, after 2000, the capital–to-RWA ratio was increased from 8% to 
10%. These capital regulatory changes probably helped boost the capital base of Canadian 
banks. 
Having studied the behaviour of Canadian banks’ capital buffers during different 
business cycles and changes in capital regulations, we now turn to the impact of changes in 
capital buffers on measures of Canadian banks’ risk. 
4.3. How sensitive are Canadian banks’ risk to changes in their capital buffer? 
Figure 4 depicts the pattern of Canadian banks’ equity risk (TRISK), Canadian stock 
market risk (VTSX) and business cycles. We observe weak co-movement between VTSX and 
business cycles. The relationship between TRISK and business cycles is ambiguous. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE. 
To address the sensitivity of banks’ risk to changes in their capital buffer, once again we turn 
to our system of simultaneous equations. We use two additional risk measures: IRISK (the 
banks’ market idiosyncratic risk) and ARISK (the implicit volatility of the banks’ assets). The 
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results are presented in Table 5, where columns 1-3 are for TRISK, columns 4-6 for IRISK 
and columns 7-9 are for the ARISK risk measure. We find that, over the entire sample period, 
changes in banks’ capital buffer BUFL are not significantly related to variations in equity 
returns risk (TRISK) or idiosyncratic risk (IRISK), but are positively and significantly related 
to variations in ARISK. However, the effect is less pronounced during the 1996 amendment 
and Basel II periods. Thus, Canadian banks have better succeeded at aligning risk-taking and 
their capital base; this is consistent with the second pillar of Basel II on maintaining a 
permanent supervisory review process to adjust capital levels in response to risk exposures. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. 
Analyzing the regulation dummies separately, we find that DREG1 positively impacts 
TRISK and that DREG2 negatively affects it (see Table 4). This may be seen as evidence of 
the success of the combination of risk-based capital requirements suggested by Basel Accords 
and the non risk-based capital constraints imposed by Canadian regulators, especially after the 
adoption of the 1996 amendment to Basel I and Basel II by OSFI. 
The relationship between risk and OUTGAP is not significant for any of the risk 
measures. The co-movement between business cycles and measures of risk thus does not 
appear. Also, note that the positive co-movement between capital buffers and the business 
cycle is present for all risk measures used. 
Since variations in both capital buffers and in banks’ risk-adjusted return on capital 
and hence their performance, in the next section we analyze how changes in the capital buffer 
affect banks’ performance. 
4.4. How do induced changes in capital buffers affect the performance of Canadian 
banks? 
Figure 5 depicts Canadian banks’ performance measured by equity returns and 
business cycles. It appears that bank equity returns are negatively correlated to the business 
cycle, confirming the results of Table 2. This may be explained by a combination of several 
factors. First, the development of market derivatives and credit securitization in the late 1990s 
enabled banks to hedge the market risk component of their portfolio. Second, with the 
development of securitization, the introduction in 1998 of market risk as a distinct risk 
category pushed banks to reshuffle their asset portfolios towards assets with low market risk 
charges. 
16 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE. 
To determine how capital buffer variations affect these banks’ performance, we once 
again turn to our system of simultaneous equations. The results are presented in Table 6, 
where columns 1-3 are for equity returns (RET), columns 4-6 for return on assets (ROA) and 
columns 7-9 for Tobin’s Q (QTOB) as performance measures. 
For RET, the coefficient is not significant over the Basel regulatory periods. For 
QTOB, it is significantly negative, and for ROA, it is significantly positive. Thus, we observe 
that positive variations in capital buffers are not a significant factor explaining variations in 
banks’ return on equity. With the other performance measures, we instead observe instead that 
a variation in bank capital buffers has a positive and significant impact on variations in ROA, 
while it has a significant and negative impact on QTOB. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE. 
The regulatory environment dummies DREG1 and DREG2 have a positive and 
significant impact on banks’ equity returns (RET), as well as return on assets (ROA). After 
controlling for other confounding effects, this implies that Basel I and Basel II have improved 
banks’ performance. It can be interpreted as Canadian banks being well-capitalized and able 
to easily meet Basel capital requirements. 
We also analyze the interactions between capital buffer and regulatory dummy 
variables in the same equations (DREG1*∆BUFL and DREG2*∆BUFL) to account for the 
effect of capital buffer on performance following the adoption of Basel I and Basel II. The 
results indicate that, for all of the performance measures, the behaviour of ∆BUFL*DREG is 
more or less the same under Basel I and Basel II. More precisely, it indicates that bank buffers 
have no impact on changes in return on equity of Canadian banks, while they negatively 
impact ROA and positively impact Tobin’s Q. These results are intuitive. In fact, the 
combined negative impacts of the buffer and regulation significantly reduces the variation in 
return on assets, meaning that it reduces bank earnings. But the overall effect of the buffer on 
ROA remains positive. The non-significant results on equity returns suggests that market 
participants did not find this regulation to affect them. Finally, the result for Tobin’s Q means 
that banks tend to reduce their level of investment when the capital buffer increases during the 
Basel regulatory periods. 
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V. Robustness Checks 
In this section we verify the sensitivity of our results to different model specifications 
such as different capital buffer measures and the subprime crisis period which begins in 2007. 
The positive co-movement between capital buffers and the business cycle observed in 
Table 4 holds for all measures of risk (see Table 5) and performance (Table 6) used. 
5.1. Alternative capital buffer measures 
We now turn to the sensitivity of the results to other capital buffer measures. The 
results are presented in Table 7. Columns 4-6 of Table 7 give the results for BUFR and 
columns 7-9 for BUFE. The effect of the business cycle on bank capital buffers is not 
significant for either BUFR or BUFE. This result highlights the importance of selecting a 
relevant measure of capital buffers. In fact, for example, to compute BUFR and BUFE, we 
need to obtain or compute risk-weighted assets (RWA). The conflicting results obtained from 
this metric can be explained by difficulties obtaining comprehensive data on risk-weighted 
assets. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE. 
5.2. Excluding the subprime period 
The subprime crisis may introduce biases in our results because of the extreme 
volatility observed in the data during that period. In order to study the sensitivity of the results 
to the subprime crisis we perform our regressions excluding the subprime crisis period (2007-
2010) to check if the crisis had a special effect on our results. The results available in columns 
4-6 of Table 8 confirm that in period of economic booms, Canadian banks increased their 
capital buffer and absorbed it in difficult times. Furthermore, the regulatory regimes have not 
had specific effects on this co-movement between business cycles and capital buffers. 
An increase in risk reduces the excess capital buffer held by banks; this differs from 
the results across the entire sample, where the impact is not significant. But changes in banks’ 
capital buffers are still not significantly related to the change in their equity returns risk, as 
was the case for the entire sample. As for the performance measure RET, variations in capital 
buffers have no significant impact, as was the case for the entire sample. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This paper examines the cyclical behaviour of Canadian banks’ capital buffers (the 
difference between the banks’ capital levels and minimum capital requirements) and analyzes 
its impact on the banks’ risk and performance throughout business cycles and in response to 
Canadian regulatory changes during various Basel regimes. Our work departs from the 
literature on capital buffers in several respects. First, it stands out among studies of the 
Canadian banking sector in its use of a comprehensive dataset over a relatively long time 
frame (1982-2010). This sample period allows us to account for at least three business cycles 
and three major regulatory regimes: (1) the period before the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI) adopted Basel I guidelines, from 1982 to 1987; (2) 1988 to 
1997, when OSFI adopted and enforced the Basel I Accord; and (3) 1998 to 2010, after OSFI 
adopted the 1996 amendment to the Basel I Accord, which introduced market risk as a distinct 
risk category, and the Basel II period. Second, our study is original in studying the cyclical 
behavior of bank capital buffers with respect to business cycles and regulatory changes—a 
question of paramount importance in the aftermath of the subprime credit crisis—on the 
resilient Canadian banking sector. Third, we study bank capital buffer, risk and performance 
simultaneously using a two-step generalized method of moments (2SGMM) framework. 
Comprehensively addressing the relationship between capital buffers, business cycles, risk, 
performance and regulatory changes in the Canadian context constitutes an important 
contribution to the literature. 
We address the following research questions: (1) Do Canadian banks’ capital buffers 
run counter to business cycles? (2) Are Canadian banks’ capital buffers sensitive to changes 
in capital regulation? (3) How sensitive are Canadian banks risk to changes in their capital 
buffer? (4) How do induced changes in the capital buffer affect the performance of Canadian 
banks? 
We find that Canadian banks are well capitalized, which helps explain why they 
weathered the recent financial crisis so well. We document that bank capital buffers exhibit a 
positive co-movement with business cycles. This result holds even when we control for 
changes in regulatory regimes. We also find no strong evidence that variations of banks’ 
capital buffer impact banks’ exposure to risks and return on equity. By and large, there is no 
strong relationship between capital buffers and risk. Hence, the motive to hold an excess 
capital buffer may be driven by market discipline. 
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We can then draw two main policy implications on the basis of Canadian experience. 
First, rigorous and strict implementation of both risk-based and non-risk-based capital 
requirements can help mitigate the well-documented procyclicality associated with current 
Basel risk-based capital charges. Second, increases in capital requirements should occur 
during periods of strong economic growth because it is during these periods that banks can 
accumulate more capital; conversely, during recessionary times, a reduction in capital 
requirements would be desirable since it may provide more flexibility for banks to weather 
downturns. 
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Figures 1a & 1b: Banks’ capital buffer and business cycles in Canada 
The right hand side axis gives values of business cycles measured by the cyclical component of real 
GDP. The left hand axis represents values of the cyclical part of capital buffers. To compute this last 
variable, we first adjust the seasonal components of capital buffer (by using the moving average over 
four quarters), then we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to obtain cyclical components. The 
regulatory capital buffer (BUFR) is defined as the difference between banks’ capital ratio and 
minimum regulatory capital ratio. The leverage-based capital buffer (BUFL) is equal to the difference 
between the shareholders’ equity-to–assets ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an 
unweighted leverage ratio. 
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Figure 2: Business cycles and capital regulations 
 
The gray areas designate major regulatory changes in the Canadian banking sector: (1) enforcement of 
Basel I in 1988, (2) implementation of the 1996 amendment of Basel I taking effect in 1998 and (3) 
the period in the spirit of Basel II starting in 2004. CYCLE is the cyclical component of real GDP. 
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Figure 3: Trend of banks’ capital and leverage ratio between 1982 and 2010 
Before the enforcement of Basel I by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), 
in 1988, the bank’s capital ratio was computed as the bank’s capital-to-total assets ratio, and after 1988 
it is computed as the capital-to-RWA ratio and has been taken from Canadian banks’ official 
publications. Up to 1988, we consider a minimum capital ratio (MIN_CAP) of 8% as fixed by Basel I 
in 1987. In 2000, the minimum capital ratio was increased to 10% in Canada. The two graphs show 
the average ratios for the six big chartered banks. The gray areas designate major changes in capital 
regulation in the Canadian banking sector: (1) the enforcement of Basel I in 1988, (2) implementation 
of the 1996 amendment of Basel I that takes effect in 1998, and (3) the period in the spirit of Basel II 
starting in 2004. In the second graph (panel B), the scale on the right hand axis is for the capital ratio 
(CAP) measure and the left hand scale is for the balance sheet leverage ratio measure (LEV). For the 
maximum leverage ratio (MAX_LEV), the Canadian banking supervisory authority fixed a balance 
sheet leverage ratio cap of 30 from 1982 to 1991. Late in 1991, the limit was decreased to 20 and this 
was the ceiling until 2000, when it was increased to 23 under certain conditions. 
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Figure 4: Canadian banks’ risk, market risk and business cycles 
The left hand axis gives values of the business cycles measured by the cyclical component of real 
GDP. The right hand axis represents the levels of average banks’ equity risk (TRISK) and Canadian 
market equity risk (VTSX). To compute the last two variables, we first adjust their seasonal 
components using a moving four-quarter average, then we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to 
obtain cyclical parts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Banks’ performance and business cycles 
The left hand axis gives values of the business cycles, measured by the cyclical component of real 
GDP. The right hand side axis represents the levels of banks’ average equity return (RET). To 
compute the last variable, we first adjust the seasonal components of RET using the moving four-
quarter average, then we use the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter to obtain cyclical components. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables (quarterly data from 1982 (Q1) to 2010 (Q2)) 
 
 
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS OBS MEAN STD. DEV Min Max 
CAP Book capital ratio = GAAP book capital / risk-weighted assets 609 0.139 0.043 0.055 0.258 
CAPL Inverse balance sheet leverage ratio = shareholders’ equity / total assets 675 0.047 0.008 0.026 0.073 
CAPE  Economic capital ratio = VaR economic capital / risk-weighted assets  625 0.097 1.153 0.001 28.829 
BUFR Regulatory capital buffer = CAP – minimum regulatory capital 632 0.051 0.036 -0.041 0.142 
BUFL Leverage capital buffer = CAPL – (1/leverage cap)  692 0.005 0.009 -0.014 0.034 
BUFE Economic capital buffer = CAP – CAPE 588 0.035 0.600 -7.156 0.211 
ROA Return on assets = net income / total assets 670 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.013 
RET One quarter mean equity return based on daily observations    686 0.040 0.077 -0.584 0.272 
QTOB Tobin’s Q = equity market value / equity book value   645 1.449 0.536 0.255 3.179 
TRISK Total equity risk = standard deviation of daily returns over the last quarter 672 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.040 
IRISK Idiosyncratic risk = conditional variance estimated by a GARCH-M (1,1) of errors in a 
multifactor model 654 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.087 
ARISK Implicit asset volatility computed using Ronn and Verma (1986) approach 629 0.009 0.018 0.000 0.269 
VTSX Volatility of S&P/TSX index based on daily observations of one quarter  684 0.068 0.033 0.035 0.204 
CR3 Concentration ratio =  total net income of 3 biggest banks / total net income of all banks  684 0.398 1.526 -14.923 2.691 
TERM Interest rate term premium = long term government bond yield minus T-bill yield 655 0.012 0.018 -0.044 0.052 
GDPG Quarterly growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP)  714 0.006 0.008 -0.021 0.023 
OUTGAP Cyclical component of the logarithm of real GDP using HP filter  720 0.000 0.016 0.047 0.039 
CV Logarithm of charter value 644 21.402 3.521 13.103 36.941 
CREDIT Credit ratio = total loan / total asset  675 0.573 0.109 0.357 0.877 
DREG1 Dummy variable equals 1 over 1988-1997 and 0 otherwise 744 0.331 0.471 0.000 1.000 
DREG2 Dummy variable equals 1 over 1998-2010 and 0 otherwise 744 0.411 0.492 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations between banks’ specific variables 
  
  CAP CAPL CAPE BUFR BUFL BUFE ROA RET QTOB TRISK IRISK ARISK VTSX CR3 TERM GDPG OUTGAP CV CREDIT 
CAP 1                   
CAPL 0.346 1                  
CAPE  -0.049 -0.020 1                 
BUFR 0.916 0.325 -0.041 1                
BUFL 0.025 0.667 0.040 0.014 1               
BUFE 0.160 0.067 -0.497 0.153 -0.063 1              
ROA 0.015 -0.141 -0.007 0.031 0.033 -0.024 1             
RET 0.043 -0.045 0.003 0.069 -0.122 0.062 0.009 1            
QTOB 0.377 -0.006 -0.050 0.284 -0.162 0.140 0.044 0.025 1           
TRISK 0.22 0.017 -0.010 0.197 -0.055 0.015 -0.149 0.054 -0.133 1          
IRISK 0.192 0.023 0.010 0.143 -0.036 0.015 -0.131 0.033 -0.081 0.641 1         
ARISK 0.080 -0.026 0.056 0.067 -0.069 -0.041 -0.031 -0.061 0.162 0.108 0.101 1        
VTSX 0.391 0.063 -0.020 0.283 0.001 0.068 -0.063 0.067 0.183 0.687 0.488 0.146 1       
CR3 0.081 -0.034 0.000 0.050 0.013 0.008 0.043 0.025 0.179 0.025 0.015 0.045 0.135 1      
TERM 0.170 0.060 -0.024 0.165 -0.236 0.064 -0.086 0.024 0.044 0.102 0.098 0.124 0.148 0.020 1     
GDPG -0.167 -0.108 0.056 -0.090 -0.151 -0.013 0.086 -0.033 0.029 -0.142 -0.166 0.003 -0.248 0.023 0.270 1    
OUTGAP -0.001 0.093 0.037 -0.046 0.211 -0.018 -0.009 -0.076 0.087 -0.172 -0.038 -0.055 -0.070 0.196 -0.488 0.174 1   
CV -0.138 -0.860 0.024 -0.157 -0.610 0.077 0.119 0.028 0.289 -0.007 0.040 0.071 0.136 0.063 0.038 0.092 -0.169 1  
CREDIT -0.456 0.016 -0.037 -0.341 0.134 0.032 0.134 0.005 -0.568 -0.135 -0.140 -0.070 -0.451 -0.242 -0.060 0.058 -0.109 -0.222 1 
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Table 3: Aggregate capital buffer measures  
Economic capital is calculated using Value at Risk (VaR) at the 99.97% confidence level. The 
regulatory capital buffer (BUFR) is defined as the difference between banks’ capital ratio and 
minimum regulatory capital ratio. The leverage-based capital buffer (BUFL) is equal to the difference 
between the shareholders’ equity-to-assets ratio and the inverse of regulatory ceiling on an unweighted 
leverage ratio. The economic capital buffer (BUFE) is defined as the difference between banks’ capital 
ratio and their economic capital ratio. 
 
 
Business cycles 
Capital 
ratio 
(CAP) 
Economic 
capital 
ratio 
(CAPE) 
Inverse 
leverage 
ratio 
(CAPL) 
Regulatory 
capital 
buffer 
(BUFR) 
Economic 
capital 
buffer 
(BUFE) 
Leverage-
based 
capital 
buffer 
(BUFL) 
       
Expansion  0.139 0.098 0.048 0.051 0.032 0.005 
Recession  0.138 0.074 0.044 0.047 0.102 0.007 
Non conditional  0.139 0.097 0.047 0.051 0.035 0.005 
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Table 4: Estimation results of the simultaneous equations of variations in regulatory capital buffer (BUFL), risk (TRISK) and performance 
(RET) 
This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are 
performed using two-stage GMM regressions for panel data (2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statements covering 1982-2010. Market 
data was extracted from daily data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use total equity risk (TRISK) as the risk measure and equity returns (RET) 
to measure performance. The capital buffer (BUFL) is calculated as the difference between the shareholders’ equity-to-assets ratio and the inverse of the 
regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. All other variables are defined in Table 1. The values in parentheses are robust standard deviations. Model 1 is 
shown in columns 1-3, model 2 in columns 4-6, model 3 in columns 7-9 and model 4 in columns 10-12. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are respectively 
represented by *, ** and ***. 
 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  
Model 4 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 
(10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES  ∆ΒUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET 
 
∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET 
 
∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET 
            
 
   
OUTGAP  0.0296*** -0.0075 0.334  0.0397*** 0.0041 0.105  0.0270*** -0.0169 0.242 
 
0.0345*** -0.0066 -0.308 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.210)  (0.007) (0.017) (0.237)  (0.006) (0.011) (0.270) 
 
(0.012) (0.031) (0.524) 
∆BUFL   -0.078 -1.112   -0.0844 1.602   -0.510** 0.859 
 
 -0.399 14.45 
   (0.140) (2.468)   (0.226) (3.099)   (0.200) (5.441) 
 
 (0.709) (13.630) 
∆TRISK  -0.0599  0.0504  -0.0817**  -0.137  -0.0594  -0.468 
 
-0.0114  -0.25 
  (0.050)  (1.389)  (0.040)  (1.385)  (0.048)  (1.459) 
 
(0.051)  (1.411) 
∆RET  0.0053 0.0029   -0.0012 0.0025   0.0060* 0.0015  
 
-0.0009 -0.0034  
  (0.004) (0.005)   (0.003) (0.005)   (0.004) (0.005)  
 
(0.003) (0.005)  
DREG1      -0.0014*** 0.0008*** 0.0100*     
 
-0.0008*** 0.0007 0.0258* 
      (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0056)     
 
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0144) 
DREG2          0.0021*** -0.0012*** -0.0098 
 
0.0012*** -0.0009 0.0212 
          (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0115) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0183) 
DREG1*OUTGAP      0.0043 -0.0395** 0.165     
 
0.0003 -0.0299 0.528 
      (0.011) (0.016) (0.321)     
 
(0.014) (0.031) (0.575) 
DREG2*OUTGAP          0.0103 0.0154 0.248 
 
0.0038 -0.0202 0.673 
          (0.012) (0.015) (0.314) 
 
(0.016) (0.033) (0.573) 
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∆BUFL*DREG1       0.267 -3.088     
 
 0.53 -15.81 
       (0.240) (3.677)     
 
 (0.704) (13.850) 
∆BUFL*DREG2           0.591*** -3.835 
 
 0.673 -17.41 
           (0.214) (5.646) 
 
 (0.683) (13.780) 
SIZE  -0.0006***  0.0009  -0.0005***  0.0068*  -0.0018***  0.0078 
 
-0.0013***  0.0027 
  (0.0002)  (0.0032)  (0.0002)  (0.0037)  (0.0002)  (0.0091) 
 
(0.0003)  (0.0084) 
BUFR  0.0006    0.0040**    0.0013   
 
0.0031*   
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
 
(0.002)   
CREDIT  -0.0025***    0.0022**    -0.0003   
 
0.0017*   
  (0.0009)    (0.0009)    (0.0009)   
 
(0.0010)   
VTSX   0.0184***    0.0366***    0.0415***  
 
 0.0597***  
   (0.006)    (0.009)    (0.008)  
 
 (0.007)  
TERM   -0.0118 0.186   -0.0154**    -0.0094 0.175 
 
 -0.0128*  
   (0.007) (0.160)   (0.007)    (0.007) (0.168) 
 
 (0.007)  
CV   2.46E-05    6.56E-05    6.82e-05*  
 
 0.0001***  
   (0.00004)    (0.00005)    (0.00004)  
 
 (0.00004)  
CR3    -0.0002    2.77E-05    -1.23E-05 
 
  7.49E-05 
    (0.0006)    (0.0006)    (0.0007) 
 
  (0.0006) 
BUFLt-1  -0.0390***    -0.0503***    -0.0567***   
 
-0.0569***   
  (0.0091)    (0.0087)    (0.0099)   
 
(0.0093)   
TRISKt-1   -0.0311    -0.135*    -0.149***  
 
 -0.326***  
   (0.050)    (0.069)    (0.055)  
 
 (0.045)  
RETt-1    -0.166***    -0.180***    -0.180*** 
 
  -0.188*** 
    (0.054)    (0.054)    (0.056) 
 
  (0.052) 
             
 
   
Observations  565 565 565  565 565 565  565 565 565 
 
565 565 565 
R-squared  0.045 0.064 0.087  0.201 0.139 0.087  0.105 0.113 0.086 
 
0.211 0.143 0.092 
Number of banks   6 6 6   6 6 6   6 6 6 
  
6 6 6 
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Table 5: Estimation results with different risk measures 
This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are 
performed using two-stage GMM (2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statement covering 1982-2010. Market data was extracted from daily 
data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use three risk measures: total equity risk (TRISK), idiosyncratic risk (IRISK) and implicit volatility of 
assets (ARISK); we use equity return (RET) to measure performance. The capital buffer (BUFL) is calculated as the difference between the shareholders’ equity-
to-assets ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Values in parentheses are 
robust standard deviations. Model 1 is shown in columns 1-3, model 2 in columns 4-6 and model 3 in columns 7-9. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are 
respectively represented by *, ** and ***. 
 
      Model 1       Model 2       Model 3   
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET  ∆BUFL ∆IRISK ∆RET  ∆BUFL ∆ARISK ∆RET 
             
OUTGAP  0.0345*** -0.0066 -0.308  0.0344*** 0.0748 -0.242  0.0077 0.0855 -0.19 
  (0.012) (0.031) (0.524)  (0.011) (0.095) (0.539)  (0.016) (0.115) (0.685) 
∆BUFL   -0.399 14.45   0.184 13.77   4.724* 15.87 
   (0.709) (13.630)   (1.733) (13.710)   (2.741) (14.810) 
∆TRISK  -0.0114  -0.25         
  (0.051)  (1.411)         
∆IRISK      -0.0097  -0.54     
      (0.011)  (0.386)     
∆ARISK          0.0044*  0.0533 
          (0.002)  (0.134) 
∆RET  -0.0009 -0.0034   -0.0008 0.0009   -0.0102** 0.0155  
  (0.003) (0.005)   (0.003) (0.011)   (0.004) (0.024)  
DREG1  -0.0008*** 0.0007 0.0258*  -0.0009*** -9.47E-05 0.0241*  -0.0006** 0.0059** 0.0275* 
  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0144)  (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0144)  (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0153) 
DREG2  0.0012*** -0.0009 0.0212  0.0011*** -0.0035* 0.0187  0.0013*** 0.0078*** 0.0235 
  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0183)  (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0170)  (0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0177) 
DREG1*OUTGAP  0.0003 -0.0299 0.528  0.0014 -0.141 0.46  0.0237 -0.0866 0.411 
  (0.014) (0.031) (0.575)  (0.012) (0.095) (0.589)  (0.017) (0.105) (0.712) 
34 
DREG2*OUTGAP  0.0038 -0.0202 0.673  0.0035 -0.0309 0.667  0.0283 -0.0446 0.548 
  (0.016) (0.033) (0.573)  (0.014) (0.102) (0.586)  (0.018) (0.117) (0.729) 
∆BUFL*DREG1   0.53 -15.81   0.263 -14.99   -4.574 -17.22 
   (0.704) (13.850)   (1.718) (13.950)   (2.868) (15.000) 
∆BUFL*DREG2   0.673 -17.41   0.117 -16.91   -4.700* -18.9 
   (0.683) (13.780)   (1.673) (13.830)   (2.778) (14.930) 
SIZE  -0.0013***  0.0027  -0.0012***  0.0035  -0.0014***  0.0022 
  (0.0003)  (0.0084)  (0.0003)  (0.0074)  (0.0003)  (0.0076) 
BUFR  0.0031*    0.0033*    0.0032   
  (0.0018)    (0.0018)    (0.0020)   
CREDIT  0.0017*    0.0019**    0.0012   
  (0.0010)    (0.0009)    (0.0010)   
VTSX   0.0597***    0.108***    -0.0111  
   (0.007)    (0.021)    (0.017)  
TERM   -0.0128*    -0.002    0.0328  
   (0.007)    (0.019)    (0.054)  
CV   0.0001***    0.0002*    0.0005***  
   (0.00004)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)  
CR3    7.49E-05    2.66E-05    7.26E-05 
    (0.0006)    (0.0006)    (0.0006) 
BUFLt-1  -0.0569***    -0.0556***    -0.0500***   
  (0.0093)    (0.0091)    (0.0095)   
TRISKt-1   -0.326***          
   (0.045)          
IRISKt-1       -0.689***      
       (0.080)      
ARISKt-1           -0.909***  
           (0.045)  
RETt-1    -0.188***    -0.189***    -0.190*** 
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    (0.052)    (0.051)    (0.053) 
             
Observations  565 565 565  565 565 565  556 556 556 
R-squared  0.211 0.143 0.092  0.216 0.355 0.083  0.109 0.544 0.085 
Number of banks   6 6 6   6 6 6   6 6 6 
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Table 6: Estimation results with different performance measures 
This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are 
performed using two-step GMM regressions (2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statements covering 1982-2010. Market data was 
extracted from daily data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use total equity risk (TRISK) to measure risk along with three measures of 
performance: equity return (RET), return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (QTOB). The capital buffers (BUFL) are calculated as the difference between 
shareholders’ equity-to-assets ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Values in 
parentheses are robust standard deviations. Model 1 is shown in columns 1-3, model 2 in columns 4-6 and model 3 in columns 7-9. The 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels are respectively represented by *, ** and ***. 
 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆ROA  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆QTOB 
                       
OUTGAP  0.0345*** -0.0066 -0.308  0.0344*** -0.0058 0.0042  0.0261** -0.0034 0.701 
  (0.0124) (0.0308) (0.524)  (0.0120) (0.0312) (0.0070)  (0.0127) (0.0313) (2.464) 
∆BUFL   -0.399 14.45   -0.514 0.748***   -0.333 -181.3*** 
   (0.709) (13.63)   (0.711) (0.261)   (0.733) (65.25) 
∆TRISK  -0.0114  -0.250  -0.0134  0.0173  -0.0246  -41.65*** 
  (0.0514)  (1.411)  (0.0504)  (0.0292)  (0.0621)  (11.22) 
∆RET  -0.0009 -0.0034          
  (0.0031) (0.0049)          
∆ROA      -0.177*** 0.166      
      (0.0579) (0.126)      
∆QTOB          -0.0035*** 0.0020  
          (0.0009) (0.0019)  
DREG1  -0.0008*** 0.0007 0.0258*  -0.0008*** 0.0006 0.0006***  -0.0003 0.0006 -0.194*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0144)  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0002)  (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0638) 
DREG2  0.0012*** -0.0009 0.0212  0.0013*** -0.0010 0.0008***  0.0014*** -0.0011 -0.292*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0183)  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0003)  (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0828) 
DREG1*OUTGAP  0.0003 -0.0299 0.528  0.0014 -0.0313 -0.0048  -0.0037 -0.0352 -0.403 
  (0.0139) (0.0306) (0.575)  (0.0137) (0.0309) (0.0085)  (0.0142) (0.0315) (2.547) 
37 
DREG2*OUTGAP  0.0038 -0.0202 0.673  0.0030 -0.0226 -0.0030  0.0009 -0.0230 -0.548 
  (0.0156) (0.0333) (0.573)  (0.0154) (0.0336) (0.0085)  (0.0168) (0.0330) (2.792) 
∆BUFL*DREG1   0.530 -15.81   0.666 -0.738***   0.509 172.7*** 
   (0.704) (13.85)   (0.708) (0.268)   (0.725) (66.34) 
∆BUFL*DREG2   0.673 -17.41   0.791 -0.715***   0.596 171.2*** 
   (0.683) (13.78)   (0.686) (0.261)   (0.702) (64.13) 
SIZE  -0.0013***  0.0027  -0.0013***  -7.24e-05  -0.0016***  0.177*** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0084)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0003)  (0.0411) 
BUFR  0.0031*    0.0031*    0.0041**   
  (0.0018)    (0.0018)    (0.0019)   
CREDIT  0.0017*    0.0017*    -2.64e-05   
  (0.0010)    (0.0010)    (0.0011)   
VTSX   0.0597***    0.0595***    0.0635***  
   (0.0067)    (0.0069)    (0.0066)  
TERM   -0.0128*    -0.0127*    -0.0154**  
   (0.0071)    (0.0071)    (0.0076)  
CV   0.0001***    0.0001***    0.0001***  
   (4.27e-05)    (4.29e-05)    (4.17e-05)  
CR3    7.49e-05    4.04e-05    -0.0038 
    (0.0006)    (5.65e-05)    (0.0027) 
BUFLt-1  -0.0569***    -0.0588***    -0.0530***   
  (0.0093)    (0.0093)    (0.0098)   
TRISKt-1   -0.326***    -0.326***    -0.327***  
   (0.0452)    (0.0459)    (0.0459)  
RETt-1    -0.188***         
    (0.0515)         
ROAt-1        -0.728***     
        (0.0744)     
QTOBt-1            -0.138*** 
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            (0.0327) 
                      
Observations  565 565 565  565 565 565  565 565 565 
R-squared  0.211 0.143 0.092  0.197 0.149 0.328  0.030 0.097 -0.157 
Number of banks   6 6 6   6 6 6   6 6 6 
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Table 7: Estimation results with different capital buffer measures 
This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are 
performed using two-step GMM regressions (2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statements covering 1982-2010. Market measures were 
extracted from daily data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use total equity risk (TRISK) to measure risk, and equity return (RET) to measure 
performance. Capital buffers (BUFL) are calculated as the difference between the shareholders’ equity-to-asset ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on 
an unweighted leverage ratio. The regulatory capital buffer (BUFR) is calculated as the difference between the book capital ratio (CAP) and the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement. Economic capital buffers BUFE are the difference between banks’ actual capital ratio and their economic capital ratio (CAPE). 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. Values in parentheses are robust standard deviations. Model 1 in is shown in columns 1-3, model 2 in columns 4-6 and 
model 3 in columns 7-9. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are respectively represented by *, ** and ***. 
 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET  ∆BUFR ∆TRISK ∆RET  ∆BUFE ∆TRISK ∆RET 
             
OUTGAP  0.0345*** -0.0066 -0.308  -0.0677 0.189 -3.03  -1.662 -0.0171 -0.87 
  (0.012) (0.031) (0.524)  (0.066) (0.271) (3.148)  (5.777) (0.047) (0.856) 
∆BUFL   -0.399 14.45         
   (0.709) (13.630)         
∆BUFR       -11.00*** 133.0***     
       (3.236) (50.360)     
∆BUFE           0.0004 -0.0239* 
           (0.001) (0.013) 
∆TRISK  -0.0114  -0.25  1.229***  15.34**  4.037  -0.887 
  (0.051)  (1.411)  (0.365)  (7.148)  (8.125)  (1.453) 
∆RET  -0.0009 -0.0034   0.0067 -0.0533   0.986*** -0.0036  
  (0.003) (0.005)   (0.0176) (0.0496)   (0.2950) (0.0046)  
DREG1  -0.0008*** 0.0007 0.0258*  0.0025* -0.0127** 0.192***  0.0062 0.0008** 0.0128 
  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0144)  (0.0013) (0.0053) (0.0713)  (0.0487) (0.0004) (0.0091) 
DREG2  0.0012*** -0.0009 0.0212  0.0060** -0.0137*** 0.199**  0.0172 -0.0009** 0.0005 
  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0183)  (0.0024) (0.0053) (0.0794)  (0.0632) (0.0004) (0.0159) 
DREG1*OUTGAP  0.0003 -0.0299 0.528  0.0311 -0.185 2.867  1.423 -0.0194 0.956 
40 
  (0.014) (0.031) (0.575)  (0.067) (0.263) (3.163)  (5.810) (0.047) (0.871) 
DREG2*OUTGAP  0.0038 -0.0202 0.673  -0.176** -0.161 3.041  1.185 0.0004 1.035 
  (0.016) (0.033) (0.573)  (0.080) (0.263) (3.160)  (5.821) (0.049) (0.884) 
∆BUFL*DREG1   0.53 -15.81         
   (0.704) (13.850)         
∆BUFL*DREG2   0.673 -17.41         
   (0.683) (13.780)         
∆BUFR*DREG1       10.96*** -133.9***     
       (3.225) (50.420)     
∆BUFR*DREG2       11.05*** -134.0***     
       (3.237) (50.530)     
∆BUFE*DREG1           0.0033 0.866*** 
           (0.006) (0.172) 
∆BUFE*DREG2           0.0169** 0.621*** 
           (0.007) (0.190) 
SIZE  -0.0013***  0.0027  -0.0017  -0.0219  -0.0109  0.0062 
  (0.0003)  (0.0084)  (0.0016)  (0.0206)  (0.0343)  (0.0083) 
BUFR  0.0031*           
  (0.002)           
BUFL      0.0699*    0.0239   
      (0.041)    (1.110)   
CREDIT  0.0017*    -0.0042    -0.0334   
  (0.0010)    (0.004)    (0.129)   
VTSX   0.0597***    0.0521**    0.0653***  
   (0.007)    (0.022)    (0.007)  
TERM   -0.0128*    0.0145    -0.0101  
   (0.007)    (0.028)    (0.008)  
CV   0.0001***    -0.0002    0.0001***  
   (0.00004)    (0.00020)    (0.00004)  
CR3    7.49E-05    0.0021**    0.00041 
    (0.0006)    (0.0010)    (0.0006) 
41 
BUFLt-1  -0.0569***           
  (0.0093)           
BUFRt-1      -0.0422***       
      (0.013)       
BUFEt-1          -0.155   
          (0.196)   
TRISKt-1   -0.326***    -0.386***    -0.349***  
   (0.045)    (0.149)    (0.048)  
RETt-1    -0.188***    -0.338***    -0.228*** 
    (0.052)    (0.086)    (0.055) 
             
Observations  565 565 565  564 564 564  556 556 556 
R-squared  0.211 0.143 0.092  -0.109 -11.971 -4.495  0.114 0.124 0.146 
Number of banks   6 6 6   6 6 6   6 6 6 
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Table 8: Estimation results excluding the subprime crisis period (2007-2010) 
This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital 
buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are performed using two-step GMM regressions 
(2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statements covering 1982-2010. Market data 
was extracted from daily data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use total equity risk 
(TRISK) to measure risk and equity returns (RET) to measure performance. Capital buffers (BUFL) are 
calculated as the difference between shareholders’ equity-to-assets ratios and the inverse of the regulatory 
ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Values in parentheses 
are robust standard deviations. Model 1 (columns 1-3) includes the whole sample period 1982-2010. 
Model 2 (columns 4-6) only covers 1982-2006. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are respectively 
represented by *, ** and ***. 
 
    
Model 1  
(Period 1982-2010)   
Model 2  
(Period 1982-2006) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES  ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET   ∆BUFL ∆TRISK ∆RET 
         
OUTGAP  0.0345*** -0.0066 -0.308  0.0304*** 0.0078 -0.215 
  (0.012) (0.031) (0.524)  (0.011) (0.032) (0.527) 
∆BUFL   -0.399 14.45   -0.115 18.75 
   (0.709) (13.630)   (0.687) (13.250) 
∆TRISK  -0.0114  -0.25  -0.0995*  0.954 
  (0.051)  (1.411)  (0.053)  (1.814) 
∆RET  -0.0009 -0.0034   -0.0032 -0.0073  
  (0.003) (0.005)   (0.0033) (0.0051)  
DREG1  -0.0008*** 0.0007 0.0258*  -0.0009*** 0.0006 0.0254* 
  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0144)  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0141) 
DREG2  0.0012*** -0.0009 0.0212  0.0010** -0.0002 0.0173 
  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0183)  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0185) 
DREG1*OUTGAP  0.0003 -0.0299 0.528  0.0036 -0.0319 0.485 
  (0.014) (0.031) (0.575)  (0.013) (0.031) (0.580) 
DREG2*OUTGAP  0.0038 -0.0202 0.673  0.0228 -0.0185 1.008* 
  (0.016) (0.033) (0.573)  (0.014) (0.035) (0.596) 
∆BUFL*DREG1   0.53 -15.81   0.227 -20.32 
   (0.704) (13.850)   (0.683) (13.510) 
∆BUFL*DREG2   0.673 -17.41   0.363 -22.70* 
   (0.683) (13.780)   (0.667) (13.510) 
SIZE  -0.0013***  0.0027  -0.0010***  0.0068 
  (0.0003)  (0.0084)  (0.0003)  (0.0091) 
BUFR  0.0031*    0.0013   
  (0.002)    (0.002)   
BUFL         
         
CREDIT  0.0017*    0.0020**   
  (0.0010)    (0.001)   
VTSX   0.0597***    0.0188**  
   (0.007)    (0.008)  
TERM   -0.0128*    -0.0163**  
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   (0.007)    (0.007)  
CV   0.0001***    0.0001***  
   (0.00004)    (0.00004)  
CR3    7.49E-05    2.09E-05 
    (0.0006)    (0.0006) 
BUFLt-1  -0.0569***    -0.0517***   
  (0.0093)    (0.009)   
TRISKt-1   -0.326***    -0.186***  
   (0.045)    (0.053)  
RETt-1    -0.188***    -0.199*** 
    (0.052)    (0.055) 
         
Observations  565 565 565  510 510 510 
R-squared  0.211 0.143 0.092  0.249 0.08 0.088 
Number of  banks   6 6 6   6 6 6 
 
